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  In a variety of books and articles, both published and in process, I’ve been out pushing 
the idea of the “economics of muddling through” as the description of the approach to policy that 
will become standard in economics over the next 20 or 30 years. The argument is both 
prescriptive—I argue muddling through is what should be done, and descriptive—I argue that 
muddling through is what is currently being done, although, like Monsieur Jourdain speaking 
prose in Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, many economists don’t recognize that’s what 
they are doing.
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  If we’ve been muddlers for so long, why should we be willing to admit it now? I think 
there are three reasons.  
•  First, there is a change occurring in formal theorizing in which the holy trinity—
rationality, greed, and equilibrium—is being abandoned as required aspects of any model, 
and being replaced with a slightly broader trinity--purposeful behavior, enlightened self 
interest and sustainability.  
•  Second, the work in the formal general equilibrium model built upon the foundation of 
the holy trinity has been explored; all the “low hanging fruit” has been picked, and young 
theoretical researchers are naturally gravitating to less explored areas. 
•  Third, today’s muddling through is not your father’s muddling through; it involves the 
use of a whole range of applied mathematics that is difficult to use unless we admit we 
are muddling. Today’s muddling is technically impressive muddling and is a far cry from 
the armchair heuristics that characterized early muddling.  
  The paper is organized as follows: First I consider the history of welfare economics, 
providing a narrative of how we got to where we are. Second, I briefly outline some important 
changes that are currently occurring in economics. Third, I expand on my reasons why I believe 
we are now ready to accept a muddling through characterization of applied policy whereas 
before we were not.  
A Brief History of Welfare Economics  
                                                 
∗Parts of this paper come from early drafts of a book I am currently working on with William Brock entitled The 
Economics of Muddling Through. (Colander and Brock, forthcoming) At this point only I am responsible for the 
arguments presented here. 
1 Actually, though, I suspect most economists do know that we’re muddlers; we are just rather hesitant to admit it. In 
fact, it may be because we know deep down that we are muddlers that we spend so much time structuring our 
analysis so that it looks like we not. Muddling Through and Policy Analysis 
Welfare economics is the study of the policy implications that can formally be drawn 
from economic theory. It asks the question: What is the relevance of theory for applied policy? 
The “muddling through” answer to this question is that theory serves as a guide for reasoned 
judgment, and thus is an input into policy, but that no policy implications follow from theory. 
The degree to which economists have been willing to accept that answer has varied over time, 
and thus their willingness to accept that applied policy work is essentially muddling through has 
varied.  
Today, looking at the principles and intermediate texts, which (since welfare economics 
is no longer actively taught in undergraduate or graduate school) are as close to welfare theory as 
most economists get today, one gets no inkling that applied policy is muddling through. Instead, 
the texts convey the impression that policy is guided by what might be called an “economics of 
control” framework. In that economics of control framework, applied policy is the direct 
application of economic theory. It is designed to equate marginal social costs with marginal 
social benefits, eliminate externalities, and undertake other policies to achieve economic 
efficiency. 
Welfare Economics in Micro 
To understand how that economics of control approach came to be the textbook model of 
policy, it is helpful to briefly consider the history of welfare theory that began with A. C. Pigou’s 
attempt to derive policy results from the theoretical model. Before Pigou, policy was generally 
not presented in specific models, but was part of a broader philosophical and political set of 
arguments associated with the economics of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, which sometimes 
went under the name “Grand Tradition.” For both of these writers applied policy was 
sophisticated muddling through; they blended together philosophical, psychological, and 
economic arguments to arrive at reasoned pronouncements about economic policy. They were 
broad social scientists rather than narrow technical economists.  
Around the turn of the century J.N. Keynes (1896) tried to codify the rules of applied 
policy. In his Scope and Method of Economics he classified the applied policy branch of 
economics as an art, which was separate from both positive and normative economics. Positive 
economics—economic theory--focused on how the economy functioned; normative economics 
focused on what the goals of economic policy should be, and the art of economics provided a 
bridge between the two; it was the branch of economics that considered how to achieve the goals 
determined in normative economics, given the insights about the way the economy functioned 
that were developed in positive economics.  
  Keynes argued that the art of economics involved going outside the realm of economics 
alone, and that economists, in their role as economists, were best advised to stay out of the 
business of giving policy advice. They should stick to the study of economic theory—to positive 
economics--and focus their analysis on how the economy operated, and not draw policy advice 
from that theory. The reason for this was that, for Keynes, policy was inevitably a muddle that 
necessarily involved rules of thumb, pragmatism, and good sense. It required a quite different, 
and looser, methodology than was appropriate for positive economics. To emphasize this point 
Keynes specifically distinguished economic theorems--implications drawn from economic 
models, from economic precepts--general rules of applied policy drawn from economic 
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reasoning. While in practice Keynes’ methodological approach was not closely followed, it was 
accepted as being the best prescriptive statement of the correct approach to applied policy. So at 
the turn of the 19
th century the stated approach to applied policy was a muddling through 
approach. 
  A first step away from muddling through occurred when Pigou, in his Economics of 
Welfare, (1932) tried to avoid the art of economics and incorporate applied economics into 
positive economic science. He attempted to make a seamless flow from theory to policy precepts. 
However, Pigou’s policy precepts were not the laissez faire precepts of the earlier Classical 
tradition, but instead were a set of activist precepts that involved internalizing externalities and 
subsidizing increasing cost industries in order to equate marginal social benefits with marginal 
social costs. It was only a first step for two reasons. First, Pigou saw a limited domain for 
welfare economics; it was only an input into the policy decision-making process, it was not the 
entire policy process.
2 Thus, he defined welfare economics as “that part of social welfare which 
can be brought, directly or indirectly, into relation with the measuring-rod of money.” Second, he 
accepted a material welfare concept of utility in which interpersonal comparisons of welfare 
were possible. This material welfare approach integrated general elements of popular thinking 
into the goals of the analysis, especially as that analysis related to income distribution. That’s 
why Pigou could support a progressive income tax on the basis of theory. 
  Lionel Robbins attacked Pigou’s material welfare approach. In his “Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science” (1935) Robbins strongly reiterated J.N. Keynes’ argument 
that “scientific” economists must wear two hats, one as a policy advisor, the other as a 
theoretician, and that there could be no seamless connection between the two. In making that 
argument, however, he shifted ground, and interpreted utility within an ordinalist, rather than a 
material welfare, framework.  
  The difference between the material welfare and ordinalist approaches can be seen by 
considering Pareto’s distinction between utility and ophelimity.
3 For Pareto, utility referred to 
usefulness, was determinable by introspection, and was comparable across averages of 
individuals. Marshall and Pigou accepted that interpretation of utility and used it as the basis of 
their welfare economics. For them, the foundation of the application of theory to policy was 
introspection. Thus, generally accepted normative views about comparability of welfare were 
built into applied policy. This view of utility, which is not well known now, was distinguished by 
Pareto from ophelimity, which referred to satisfaction of desire; it was not determinable, and was 
not comparable among individuals. Marshall and Pigou took the Pareto-utility approach; for 
them utility was a rough and ready guide for policy that embodied generally accepted welfare 
judgments of the society. Ordinalists, such as Robbins, took the Pareto-ophelimity approach; it 
was a precise statement about individual’s welfare and did not allow introspection.  
Robbins criticized the material welfare aspect of Pigou’s work for the interpersonal 
                                                 
2 Pigou’s presentation of welfare economics was actually an extension of Marshall’s applied policy analysis, 
although, as was often the case, Marshall had tried to maintain a firm foot in both positions, and thus it was hard to 
pin down precisely what his position was regarding the relation between theory and policy. Pigou’s presentation 
was much clearer. Because it was he exposed the introspection upon which the material welfare approach to theory 
that he used, was based, and thereby opened the analysis up to serious criticisms. 
3 See Cooter and Rappaport (1984) for a discussion of the distinction between these two approaches. 
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welfare judgments that it required, and argued that welfare theory must pull out policy precepts 
from theory without the introspection inherent in the material welfare approach. He argued that 
there was no scientific basis for making interpersonal welfare judgments. To avoid including 
such judgments as part of welfare economics he defined economics as “the allocation of scare 
resources among alternative ends,” which nicely fit into a utility optimizing framework. This 
definition became the standard textbook definition of economics, replacing Marshall’s “study of 
mankind in the normal pursuit of business” definition, and built into economics the ophelimity 
interpretation of utility, which was broader and had suggested an empirical, introspective, rather 
than a logical-deductive, approach.  
Robbins’ arguments won the day and in doing so both expanded and contracted the 
domain of economics. They expanded it because economics now included all activities and 
goods, and made no distinction between luxuries and necessities. The materialist welfare 
approach made a distinction and was applicable only for broad categories—it was a tool of 
muddling through--a rough and ready concept to talk about policy as it relates to classes of 
people, not a precise tool to talk about individual welfare. But Robbins simultaneously 
contracted the domain of economics by limiting the amount of interpersonal comparability that 
was allowed, since that comparability had no scientific basis.  
  The result of this change from a materialist welfare to ordinalist interpretation of utility 
involved a change in the way welfare economics was conceived. Whereas Marshall’s and 
Pigou’s welfare economics was a rough guide for economists who were doing actual policy 
work, and involved making generally accepted interpersonal welfare comparisons, under 
Robbins’s approach, welfare economics became a highly esoteric topic, which asked under what 
conditions policies theoretically can definitely improve the welfare of society. Welfare 
economics became a deductive scientific analysis, not a societal tool of muddling through. By 
the 1950s this ordinalist view came to dominate the profession and set the stage for the modern 
textbook theory of applied policy that remains today. 
  The next step in the evolution of modern welfare economics occurred when a student of 
Robbins’s, Abba Lerner, as part of his discussion of the socialist calculation debate, spelled out 
the welfare conditions necessary to achieve social efficiency in his Economics of Control. Lerner 
argued that planned market economies could achieve all the benefits of the market by following 
the rules of welfare economics. Lerner’s economics of control provided the architectural plans 
for maximizing social welfare of an economy, and if planners were in possession of them they 
could do it as well as the market.
4 For Lerner applied policy economics was the application of a 
scientific set of rules determined by economic theory to be followed by policy makers and by 
agents in the economy. These rules for both agents and policy makers form the foundation for 
the current textbook presentation of economic theory.  
The economics of control was the final step away from the muddling through approach 
that was inherent in J.N. Keynes’s and earlier Classical economist’s applied policy approach. It 
made economic theory the guiding factor in policy analysis. There was no place for Keynes’ art 
                                                 
4 Lerner attempted to include the distribution of income in the analysis with his assumptions about uncertainty and 
utility maximization, but that was soon dropped, as the scientific foundation for any interpersonal utility 
judgments, even those based upon uncertainty, were questioned. 
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of economics in the economics of control; it was unnecessary since policy was a precise science.
5 
In the economics of control, economic analysis became the decision criteria, not an input 
into a broader decision process, and the results that came out of welfare economics were what 
“should” be done, not some general results to help economists determine appropriate policy. 
This, of course, violated Hume’s Dictum that you cannot derive a “should” from an “is”, but that 
problem was pushed under the rug by narrowing the goals of economics to a single criteria—
ironically called Pareto optimality—that had broad support.
6 Textbook economic theory became 
the analysis of under what conditions a market economy will lead to policies that improved the 
welfare of at least one individual, while reducing the welfare of no individual.  
The welfare economics associated with Pareto optimality was called the new welfare 
economics. In the new welfare economics any position that achieved a result in which no one 
could be made better off without making someone else worse off was an efficient position, and 
the new welfare economics came to focus on efficiency to the exclusion of other goals. 
Accepting the Pareto Criteria as the central focus of policy allowed economic models to reach 
formally clear conclusions about policy, but it severely limited the applicability of new welfare 
economics to any real-world problems.
7 
This connection between theory and policy on the basis of efficiency significantly 
influenced the direction of research in economics. Specifically, it led theoretical economists to 
focus on abstract models rather than concrete problems, and to a separation of applied work from 
purely theoretical work. The work associated with Arrow/Debreu is the best example of the 
focus of this formal theoretical work, which was quite separate from what applied economists 
did or were interested in.  
Applied microeconomics followed a different path; it focused on empirical testing; it did 
not rely on formal theoretical models, but instead on what might be called an educated common 
sense—exploring the effect of incentives and determines how much they matter. Not much 
theory was needed for this--the only theory much of this work needs is that incentives matter. It 
also led to welfare economics no longer being taught. Why teach welfare economics, if it simply 
came to the conclusion that one cannot apply theory to policy questions? 
Welfare Economics in Macro 
The welfare economics of macroeconomics followed a quite different path. The goal of 
macro policy was assumed to be full employment and zero inflation, without any connection of 
                                                 
5 This meant that when Milton Friedman wrote his famous essay on methodology (Friedman 1953) although he cited 
Keynes’ tripartite division, he immediately forgot the art branch, and discussed economics as if it only involved 
positive and normative economics. While there were multiple discussions of Friedman’s essay no one objected to 
the missing art. 
6 This, of course, does not solve the problem. As Sen (1970) pointed out, Pareto optimality cannot be made free of 
normative judgments.  
7 See, for example, Graff (1967) who argues that welfare economics has little applicability, and that economists 
should stay out of policy discussions and concentrate on describing how the economy works. The new new 
welfare economics, which adds back value judgments and interpersonal comparability with a social welfare 
function framework did not add significant applicability to welfare theory, because it was kept abstract. But it did 
open up the door to much formal esoteric analysis. 
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those goals to individual welfare. Macro models assumed agent actions that were not necessarily 
consistent with optimization, but were stable and empirically determinable. In Keynesian macro 
models economists could use the steering wheel of monetary and fiscal policy to control the 
economy and direct the economy to the desired goals. Output too high—use contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policy; output too low--use expansionary policy. This mechanistic approach 
was also developed by Lerner in the second half of his Economics of Control book. He called it 
functional finance, and it was presented with as much certainty and firmness as were his rules of 
microeconomics for the socialist planner developed in the first half of his Economics of Control 
book. The 1960s were a time of fine-tuning in macroeconomics.  
  Lerner’s welfare approach to macroeconomics did not last because it involved an 
inconsistency with the assumptions of microeconomics. As the microeconomic foundations of 
macroeconomics were explored, and the two approaches integrated, neoKeynesian policy 
analysis, which was based on Lerner’s functional finance welfare approach, was attacked by 
New Classical economists on consistency grounds. New Classical economists argued that if 
policy makers had full information, rational individuals should also be assumed to have full 
information available to them. They further argued that if agents had that information, then much 
of the benefit of Keynesian policies is eliminated; in fact, most of the Keynesian problems of 
stabilization and equilibrium at undesirable unemployment levels would not exist.
8 In New 
Classical models fluctuations in output are simply reflections of shifts in intertemporal choices, 
or irreducible noise in the stochastic system, and unemployment is simply the result of 
intertemporal inconsistencies combined with institutional rigidities.  
  This lack of consistency between agent and policy maker assumptions played an 
important role in the demise of Keynesian economics and the development of the currently 
popular dynamic stochastic intertemporal equilibrium approach to macro. Model consistency 
between agent’s information sets and policy maker’s information sets seems logically desirable; 
if policy makers have access to that information, then why shouldn’t the agents in the model also 
have access to it, at least at a cost? So modern intertemporal equilibrium macro is defensible on 
these consistency grounds. It is simply the extension of the economics of control micro 
framework to macro. Thus, I see this movement toward New Classical economics as an 
important step in the development of economic thinking because it brings both micro and macro 
onto the same footing, and helps clarify the issues. It shows the full implications of taking an 
economics of control approach to policy.  
The Changing Nature of Modern Economics 
  Now that I have completed my brief history of welfare economics, let me turn to what I 
see as the most important changes occurring in modern economics--the movement away from the 
holy trinity assumptions that I discussed at the beginning of the paper. In my view modern 
economics is slowly moving away from the holy trinity toward a broader foundation of economic 
theory of purposeful behavior, enlightened self-interest and sustainability. The changes that are 
occurring can be seen in a variety of theoretical work, such as work in behavioral economics, 
                                                 
8 An example of the implications of the New Classical approach for policy can be seen in Robert Lucas’s recent 
Presidential address (2003) in which he argued that stabilization has little welfare gain, and that the policy focus of 
macro should be on growth. 
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evolutionary game theory, agent based modeling, experimental economics, and new institutional 
economics—the list could be extended significantly.
9 Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Colander, Holt and Rosser, forthcoming), much of the work that is considered cutting edge 
theoretical work falls into the category of moving away from the holy trinity.  
  One can see the change in the allocation of recent awards in economics. For example, 
Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith recently won a Nobel Prize for their work in behavioral and 
experimental economics and Mat Rabin won the John Bates Clark medal for work on behavioral 
economics. Because of these changes today one would no longer describe modern economics as 
neoclassical economics. (Colander 2000a) 
  I do not want to overstate the degree of change that is currently taking place in the 
profession; one sees only slight change in the work of most existing economists. But I see these 
small changes as an indicator of much larger future changes. The reason is that the acceptance of 
behavioral rather than axiomatic foundations to agent’s actions involves a major change in the 
underlying vision of what economists study, and how they study it. Specifically, I see the 
changes leading from a vision that sees economics as the study of infinitely bright agents in rich 
information environments to a vision of economics as the study of reasonably bright individuals 
in information poor environments. It is this switch that is central to my thesis that economics is 
moving away from an economics of control framework--a framework within which infinitely 
bright economists with full knowledge of the system approach policy, to an economics of 
muddling through framework--a framework within which reasonably bright economists with 
limited knowledge of the system approach policy.  
  Another way of describing my thesis is that the vision of the economy will evolve from 
its previous vision of highly complex, “simple system” to a highly complex “complex system.”
10 
Simple systems, no matter how complex, are reducible to a low dimensional set of equations, 
making it possible to model the system analytically and to conceive of controlling it. A complex 
system is not, and must be represented in another fashion—through simulation, or through 
insights gained with replicator dynamics. One never has a full analysis of the entire complex 
system, and it cannot be controlled.  
  Simple and complex systems differ in their micro foundations. Simple systems can be 
studied from micro foundations alone. Complex systems involve emergent properties, and cannot 
be understood from an analysis of the elements of the components of that system. There can still 
be micro foundations, but the micro foundations of complex systems are contextual, and can only 
be understood in reference to the existing system. Such complex systems are built up in path 
dependent stages, making individual optimization within such systems history and institution 
                                                 
9 That is close to happening in behavioral economics in certain fields such as finance. As Richard Thaler has said, 
once, people asked what was behavioral finance; now people ask what other type of finance is there? A leading 
indicator of the changes that are occurring, is the hiring priorities of top schools, and the needs their hiring 
departments see. In the early 2000s behavioral economics is seen as a hiring priority; experimental economics is 
not yet a totally accepted hiring priority, and agent based modeling is as yet hardly on the horizon.
9 
10 For a discussion of what is meant my complex system see Auyang (2000) 
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specific. This means that its institutional structure is central to understanding complex systems, 
and that any assumed rationality must involve some boundedness.
11 
  The acceptance of this complexity vision of the economy involves a shift in economics 
far more fundamental than anything associated with the movements away from the holy trinity 
that the profession has made so far. But by moving away from the holy trinity economics is 
making the first step toward such a new vision.
12 
Understanding the Nature of the Change 
  Jokes about the economics profession are often revealing of the vision that the profession 
has of itself, and one joke that is often told to make fun of economists’ deductive and non-
practical tendencies is the can opener joke. In it a physicist and a chemists offer practical 
solutions to a problem of opening a can on a desert island, while the economist offers a useless 
solution--to assume a can opener.
13 That joke is not very complementary of economists and it 
provoked a less well-known joke that portrays economics in a better light. The joke is the 
following: 
  A physicist, an engineer, and an economist are given a watch, a string, and a ball and told 
that the person who can best measure the height of a building will get into a Scientific Hall of 
Fame. The physicist ties the ball to the string, hangs it down from the roof and, using the 
stopwatch, calculates the length of time it takes the pendulum to swing from side to side. From 
that information he estimates the height of the building. The engineer takes the ball and drops it 
off the top. He then uses the stopwatch to determine how long it takes to fall, and estimates the 
height of the building accordingly. The economist, however, wins the place in the Hall of Fame 
by taking the stopwatch, trading it for the building plans with a guard in the building, and simply 
reading the height of the building from the blueprints.  
  This joke, obviously made up by an economist, shows both the benefits of trade and the 
importance of economic theory. That theory provides a blueprint of how the economy operates, 
and thus, once found, is to be guarded at all costs. It also shows that economist’s assumption that 
the economy is a complex “simple” system, because those are the only systems for which one 
can find a complete set of blueprints.  
  The problems with this story from a complexity point of view are the assumptions that a 
set of blueprints exists, and that the building of the economy actually followed that set of 
blueprints if they did exist. The complexity vision sees the economy as emergent from a set of 
simple decisions in a way that no one previously pictured. Thus the complexity addendum to this 
story, which Robert Bassman suggested to me in private discussions, is that when the building 
                                                 
11 These ideas are developed in Anderson, Philip W., Kenneth J. Arrow, and David Pines, eds., (1988) and Arthur, 
W. Brian, Steven N. Durlauf, and David A. Lane (1997). See also Colander (2000c). 
12 Of course the simplicity view has not always been the view of economics and thus the movement toward 
complexity will be a movement back to earlier writers, including Smith, Marshall, and Hayek. See Colander 
(2000b) for a discussion of the complexity in the history of economic thought. 
13 The joke is so well known that I do not repeat it here, but those who do not know it can find it at 
www.aeaweb.org/RFE/Neat/JokJokAboEco.html. 
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took place, the builders made adjustments to the plans, which they never marked down on the 
blueprints. The economist reading from the blueprints got the wrong answer.  
  Each of the changes currently occurring in the holy trinity can be seen as a movement 
away from a search for the blueprints of the economic system, and toward a search for 
understanding a system in which the blueprints are missing, nonexistent, or so far beyond our 
analytic capabilities that we might as well forget about them. Consider rationality. In order to 
achieve a blueprint of the economy strong rationality must be assumed, where individuals have 
information about all other’s actions, and can determine what they will do given that 
information. The models one derives given these strong assumptions are justifiable because they 
provide the blueprint for the economy—once we have that blueprint we can proceed to 
discussions of practical issues. Behavioral economics is a direct challenge to that belief—it 
involves a different sense of theory and of rationality; a behavioral economist looks at what 
people do, and builds in those observations into his or her assumptions about behavior in his or 
her models. Behavioral economics is designed for economists operating without blueprints.  
  The “simple” approach relies on theory, uses empirical observation to test the theory, and 
then builds policy issues around that “empirically tested” theory. The “complexity” approach 
relies on empirical observation, builds theory around those observations, and then builds policy 
around the resultant “empirically-determined” theory. The type of rationality assumed is a key 
difference in the two approaches. Both assume rationality—all models of economics must 
assume some type of rationality—but there is a difference in the type of rationality and the level 
of information assumed. 
Why Now? 
  Let me now turn to the reasons why I believe the profession is open to a change to 
muddling through now, and was not previously. One is the developments in macroeconomics. 
New Classical economics logically follows from assumptions of fully rational agents operating 
in an information rich environment. But for many economists—Keynesian, monetarists, and 
eclectic—the results of the analysis do not meet the “aha” factor; they do not make intuitive 
sense, and the models do not fit the empirical evidence. If the New Classical logic is correct, that 
means that it is the assumptions that have to be wrong. Thus these economists are now open to 
behavioral explanations whereas earlier they were not.  
  You can get a sense of the difference between the behavioral approach and the rational 
approach by playing what is called the 2/3rds game. In this game you are to estimate a number 
that is 2/3rds of the average number guessed by a large group of individuals. Thus if people 
guessed 75, 50, and 25, the average guess would be 50 and you would win if you guessed 33and 
1/3
rd. Rationality does not provide an answer to this game. It drives the answer toward zero. But, 
of course, guessing zero, which is what some game theorists actually do guess, has no chance of 
winning.  
  To win the game you have to go beyond rationality and into minds of individuals. You 
have to have a sense of what people will do when faced with problems that have no unique 
rational solution. That knowledge comes from introspection, experience, and empirical evidence. 
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The study of such issues is the essence of behavioral economics.
14 J.M Keynes considered these 
problems of rationality, as is evidenced in his famous beauty pageant analogy, but the Keynesian 
economics that developed from his work avoided them and stuck with the holy trinity. By 
pushing the economics of control framework to its logical conclusion, New Classical economics 
led many economists to reconsider the foundations of theory, and be willing to abandon the holy 
trinity.  
 Accepting  that  behavioralist  view has implications for the way economists picture their 
role in policy. These implications can be seen by putting the New Classical argument for 
consistency in reverse. The consistency argument for assuming rational expectations on agent’s 
parts lies in the simple argument that agents can hire economists. If one assumes that economists 
know the correct model, which might be a stochastic one, then to maintain model consistency 
one must also assume that agents also can know the correct model at least at some cost. 
Combining the two arguments led to the rational expectations revolution. 
  Muddling through achieves consistency the other way around. Rather than achieve the 
consistency between agent and policy maker by assuming both individuals and policy makers 
have full rationality and rich information sets, the economics of muddling through approach is to 
start from the other direction--to assume both policy makers and agents are operating within an 
information poor environment, and, while bright, are not infinitely bright. Neither agents nor 
economists know for sure, even stochastically, what is going to happen.  
  I sometimes picture the difference in the standard and the muddling approach approaches 
to theory and policy in reference to the building of medieval cathedrals. These cathedrals were 
built following a muddling through approach. The did not rely on scientific laws to guide the 
building, but instead on accumulated rules of thumb of what worked and what didn’t. The 
building proceeded by trial and error. Different methods of construction would be pushed to the 
limit until a cathedral caved in somewhere, and then the rules of thumb would change. As the 
stored knowledge increased, the cathedrals became more grandiose, even without a specific 
understanding of the laws underlying them. That came much later.  
  Muddling through policy follows that same approach. It is conducting policy without a 
full knowledge of the general laws of the economy, if there are any. What you can find, at best, 
are general rules of thumb for how things have worked in the past, and possibly some exploitable 
patterns. Economics of control welfare economics follows a different approach to policy; it is 
basing policy on the underlying architectural plans of the economy. 
  A second reason that I believe the economics profession is ripe to accept a muddling 
through approach to policy is the technological change that has occurred in the analytic and 
computing methods available to economists. Developments in non-linear dynamics, chaos 
theory, and computing technology eliminate the need to make as restrictive assumptions as 
before. Consider the choice from a graduate student’s perspective. Would he or she rather write a 
dissertation pushing the rationality assumption one degree further, or would he or she rather 
explore one of the infinite number of new behavioral assumptions that one can make based on 
                                                 
14 While there is no “correct” solution, some guesses are better than others, although the guesses depend on the 
group and the framing of the question. With the question framed as I have framed it in groups of economists “11” 
has often been close to the best guess.  
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findings in psychology? The “low hanging fruit” has already been picked from the first 
approach, but there is a lot of “low hanging fruit” just waiting to be picked in the behavioral 
approach. Moreover, the study of those behavioral foundations can now be technically 
impressive. Whereas before muddling through was primarily heuristic analysis, and difficult to 
publish, modern muddling through is technically impressive and increasingly publishable.
15 To 
achieve an analytic solution the full rationality models had to be kept analytically simple. The 
models used in muddling through do not, because all they are meant to do is to provide guidance, 
not analytic solutions. This leaves them free to rely on empirical measurements and experiments 
to provide choices among assumptions, and simulations to provide estimates of solutions to 
problems that are analytically intractable.  
  Schumpeter (1954) made the assumption of a unique equilibrium a necessary component 
of a science of economics. With the higher level of mathematics being taught in graduate school, 
and with the greater mathematical sophistication of those entering the profession, that restriction 
is no longer necessary, which is why these more complicated issues are being explored. As 
students are freed from the requirement of achieving a full analytic solution based on the holy 
trinity, they can use new tools to study path dependency, non-linear dynamic systems, and many 
similar complicating features that could well characterize real world processes. By understanding 
the processes that guide the economy in its evolution one can gain insight into the economy and 
to the future direction of the economy even if one does not know what it’s ultimate equilibrium 
will be.  
  As soon as one moves to these more complicated mathematical approaches, neat analytic 
solutions are far less likely to be forthcoming. Previously, that meant abandoning the approach; 
today it simply means that one moves from analytics to simulations. Thus, the strongest reason 
for my belief that the future will involve muddling through is that advances in computing power 
involve a fundamental change in technology that is reducing the value of deductive theory. If one 
can gain insight through simulation, one has far less need to gain insight through deductive 
analytic theory. As long as computing power continues to double every 18 months, eventually a 
whole new way of doing economics will become the norm: agent-based simulations. 
  In agent-based models the researcher “grows” an economy, letting simple algorithms 
describing agent behavior (algorithms developed from work in behavioral work) compete with 
one another, and see which one wins out.
16 Agent-based simulations are fundamentally different 
than simulations designed to solve equations. In agent-based modeling one analyzes the system 
without any equations describing the aggregate movement of the economy; one simply defines 
the range and decision processes of the individual actors. Through multiple simulation runs one 
can gain insight into the likelihood of certain outcomes, and of the self-organized patterns that 
emerge from the model. As computing power becomes cheaper and cheaper, such modeling will 
                                                 
15 I do not want to overstate how these changes are currently affecting economists. Most economists do variations of 
what they were taught to do, and so have not changed what they do. “Same economist” research changes only 
slightly. But the economics profession is not a static group, and so the research is also changed by the change in 
the composition of economists, with younger, newly trained economists coming in, and older economists going 
out. Thus the evolutionary hiring and retirement process affects research. As time passes, and younger, differently 
trained, economists replace older economists, the average image of what economics is and of how one does 
economics changes. 
16 For a discussion of agent-based modeling see Robert Axtell and Josh Epstein (1996) and Robert Axtell (1977). 
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likely take over the profession. Ultimately, I see virtual economies being created in which 
policies are tested to determine their effectiveness in the same way that virtual designs are 
currently tested.  
  Is such agent based modeling still economics? I believe it is; it keeps much of standard 
economics—it sees individuals as purposeful, although the precise nature of purposeful behavior 
is derived from the model rather than assumed. It assumes individuals interact and trade, and that 
successful individuals continue; unsuccessful individuals do not.  
What Does Muddling Through Tell Us about Policy? 
  In the muddling through approach that I advocate one begins with a problem to be solved, 
not a theory. Given that problem, economic reasoning begins with what Tom Schelling has 
called the “vicarious problem solving” approach. (Schelling 2003) In it one informally models 
the situation, assuming agents “operate in a purposeful manner, aware of their values and alert to 
their opportunities.” Using this approach the researcher figures out what an agent might do by 
imagining him or herself in the person’s position, as best he understands that position, and 
decides what that person will likely do given that person’s aims, values, objectives, and 
constraints. It is a type of armchair theorizing that most economists do, and that some, such as 
Ronald Coase, Gordon Tulluck, or Mancur Olson, are masters of. Thus, in many ways muddling 
through is advocating that all economists use such an armchair theorizing approach. 
  But there are two differences. In the muddling through approach that I am advocating 
such armchair theorizing is only the beginning of the analysis. It is the exploratory work that 
then will be supplemented by a variety of highly technical work, which will provide a foundation 
for the workable solution to the problem one works out. This work might include field studies, 
agent based modeling, statistical data analysis, or a variety of other techniques that might shed 
light on the issue. The second difference is that the assumptions about the agents will reflect how 
actual agents operate, and not any predetermined sense of rationality that is separate from 
introspection. Thus, the agents being modeled will be characterized by introspection--one’s 
understanding of oneself, and insights from psychology.  
  Initially, the changes in policy analysis associated with muddling through will come 
slowly and will be appended to existing thinking. Thus, the first set of policy proposal changes 
that are coming from behavioral economics involve slight addendums to standard economic 
results. These changes are acquiring the name benign paternalism (Benjamin and Laibson 
forthcoming) or libertarian paternalism. (Sunnstein and Thaler forthcoming) In this policy work 
one uses the insights coming from behavioral work in economics to modify the way in which 
policy is implemented. For example, one of the insights of behavioral work is that preferences 
are often ill formed. This fact means that small, seemingly innocuous, differences in the 
institutional environment, such as in how a choice is presented to an individual, play important 
roles in outcomes of policies. Libertarian paternalism involves structuring choices in a way that 
lead to results that the policy maker believes in best for the individual.  
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  An example that advocates of this policy use is the structure of savings plans in which 
individuals must choose whether or not they want to automatically save.
17 If the policy maker 
structures the program with the default option being that the agent saves, approximately 70% 
choose saving; if he or she structures the default option as one in which the agent does not save 
only 30% choose to save. (Sunnstein and Thaler forthcoming) If the paternalistic policy maker 
believes saving is good, he or she structures the program so that the default option is saving. In 
doing so the individual’s consumer sovereignty is not being violated, because he or she is 
choosing whether he or she wants to save, and may change at will. But by taking advantage of 
insights from psychology and structuring saving as the default option, the policy maker is 
guiding that choice to the one that the policy maker believes is best for the person.  
The Slippery Slope 
  Libertarian paternalism seems like it involves only a small change in policy implications, 
and that it can be added as an addendum to standard welfare arguments of economics. In my 
view, that is not the case, because accepting the psychological assumptions upon which it is 
based undermines standard welfare theory, and thus cannot be appended to it. Instead, the 
implications for future change in policy analysis of accepting the implications of psychological 
insights are substantial. The reason is that there is no reason for the policy maker to stop at 
libertarian policies. Accepting psychology’s insight and giving up the rationality and greed 
foundation for policy means accepting that people’s actions do not necessarily reflect what they 
would “really” want.  
  Psychological research shows that individual’s choices are influenced by a variety of 
factors and can be directed in many ways, an insight that has not gone unnoticed by many real 
world firms. Thus, based on standard economic theory without the rationality pillar, there is no 
reason to stop at libertarian policies. If one accepts that policy makers have some insight into 
what is good for individuals separate from what they actually choose, a premise that is the basis 
of libertarian paternalism, there is nothing in existing standard economic theory to state that one 
should not go further. For example, why not design policies that take into account individual’s 
tendency to exhibit hyperbolic discounting, and implement policies to restrict immediate choice, 
by guiding individuals toward precommitment against immediate gratification? Such policies 
would likely get significant support among liberal economists. 
  One can easily go further. Once one accepts that people’s actions do not necessarily 
reflect what they really want, there is no theoretical reason within the economics of control 
framework to restrict individual behavior to get people to do what is good for them. For example, 
Robert Frank (1999) argues that a set of goods, which could be called relational goods, are 
primarily desired because others have them, which means that individual’s welfare from a 
variety of luxury goods is determined by what one has relative to others. In that case, a policy of 
taxing luxuries can bring in revenue to the government and actually improve social welfare. 
Extending this line of reasoning, and assuming that advances in neuropsychology give us a much 
better sense of individual psychology, from a society’s point of view there may well be a 
determinable optimal set of tastes, and policy can be devoted to achieving that optimal set of 
tastes in order to optimize social welfare.  
                                                 
17 In the U.S. these are called 401k plans. 
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  Economists as a group, even liberal ones, would, I suspect, be very much against such 
paternalistic policies. It is in fundamental opposition to the grand liberalist tradition of 
economics. The public, however, would probably be far less concerned since economists are 
usually much more hesitant about paternalistic policies than is the general public. My point is not 
that economists should support paternalist policies; my point is that, in principle, given that one 
accepts a behavioral foundation of economics, that hesitancy to accept paternalistic policies that 
follow from is not based upon deductive theory, since the underlying model that grounded that 
view has been eliminated when one gave up rationality. Within the new model of endogenous 
tastes, agents may be made better off, even in their own minds, by government paternalistic 
actions, because agent’s actions do not necessarily reveal their true desires. Thus, the end result 
of giving up the holy trinity and adopting a behavioral foundation for economics is a much more 
complicated set of policy arguments, where right and wrong policy will be harder to characterize, 
and alternative explanations of economists’ fear of paternalism will become part of the policy 
analysis.
18 Policy analysis will require muddling through as best one can using the technical tools 
available. 
Conclusion 
  If the economy is a complex system, which I believe it is, the best we can do in policy 
analysis is to muddle through. The only question is whether we will do it openly, or pretend to be 
doing something more than that. If we do it openly, we will, I believe, do a much better job of 
policy analysis; we will more likely recognize what is, and is not important. We will recognize 
that technical work is extremely important in arriving at answers to policy questions, but that it is 
only a step in the chain of reasoning; it is not the entire reasoning process. 
  Muddling through is primarily a state of mind. It is an approach that sees both theory and 
empirical work as useful in providing insights and structuring thoughts, but not as providing the 
final answers on policy issues. Those answers will have to be arrived at through a sophisticated 
blend of philosophical, psychological, and economic arguments.
19 Adam Smith excelled in the 
nuances of that blended reasoning, and thus, in many ways the recent developments in 
economics are bringing the profession back to where it began.  
Bibliography 
 
Anderson, Philip W., Kenneth J. Arrow, and David Pines, eds. 1988. The Economy as an 
Evolving Complex System. Redwood City: Addison-Wesley. 
Arthur, W. Brian, Steven N. Durlauf, and David A. Lane, eds. 1997. The Economy as an 
Evolving Complex System II. Redwood City: Addison-Wesley. 
Auyang, Sunny Y. 2000. Foundations of Complex-System Theories in Economics, Evolutionary 
Biology, and Statistical Physics 
Axelrod, R. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation, Agent Based Models of Competition and 
Collaboration, Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
                                                 
18 In the muddling through approach that I have been advocating (Brock and Colander (2000), we argue that an 
important limitation on policy is policy makers ability to understand the effects of any policy in a complex system. 
This limitation, more so than inefficiency, lies at the heart of economists’ distrust of paternalism. 
19 Amartya Sen’s work (eg. Sen, 1999) is an example of such a blend.  
14 8/6/03 Muddling Through and Policy Analysis 
15 8/6/03 
Axtell, R. and Josh Epstein. 1996.Growing Artificial Societies from the Bottom Up. MIT and 
Brookings  
Benjamin, Daniel and David Laibson. (forthcoming) “Good Policies for Bad Governments: 
Behavioral Political Economy” Boston Fed Conference on Behavioral Economics. June.  
Brock, William and David Colander 2000 “Complexity and Policy” in D. Colander ed. The 
Complexity Vision and the Teaching of Economics, Aldershot, UK Edward Elgar.  
Brock, William and David Colander forthcoming-a. “Complexity, Pedagogy, and the Economics 
of Muddling Through” in Salizar (ed) The Economics of Complexity. Edward Elgar. 
Brock, William and David Colander. forthcoming-b The Economics of Muddling Through 
Princeton University Press (manuscript in process) 
Colander, David, Richard Holt, and Barkley Rosser. forthcoming. The Changing Face of 
Economics. University of Michigan Press. Lansing, Michigan.  
Colander, David. 2000a.“The Death of Neoclassical Economics” Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought, June.  
Colander, David. 2000b. (editor) Complexity and the History of Economic Thought. New York. 
Routledge Publishers. 
Colander, David. 2000c. (editor) The Complexity Vision and the Teaching of Economics, Edward 
Elgar. 
Cooter, Robert and Peter Rappoport. 1984. “Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare 
Economics” Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 22, No. 2. June, pp. 507-530.  
Frank, R. 1999. Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess. New York: The 
Free Press. 
Friedman, Milton. 1953. “The Methodology of Positive Economics. in Essays in Positive 
Economcis. Chicago. University of Chicago Press.  
Graff, J. de v. 1967. Theoretical Welfare Economics. London. Cambridge. 
Keynes, J. N. 1896. The Scope and Method of Political Economy. London.  
Kreps, D. 1997, “Economics—The Current Position” Daedalus, Winter.  
Lerner, Abba. 1944. The Economics of Control. MacMillan Publishers. 
Pigou, A. C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. London. MacMillan.  
Robbins, Lionel. 1935. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. London. 
MacMillan. 
Robert Lucas. 2003. “Macroeconomic Priorities” American Economic Review.  
Schelling, Thomas. 2003. “Foreword” in Collective Choice: Essays in Honor of Mancur Olson, 
edited by Jac Heckelman and Dessin Coates Springer, Berlin.  
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1954. History of Economic Analysis. New York. Oxford University Press.  
Sen, Amartya. 1970. “The Impossibility of a Paratian Liberal” Journal of Political Economy. 
Sen, Amartya. 1999.“The Possibility of Social Choice” The American Economic Review, Vol. 
89, No. 3. (June) pp. 349-378.  
Sunstein, Cass, and Richard Thaler. forthcoming. “Libertarian Paternalism” Chicago Law 
Review  
Weintraub, E. Roy. 2002 How Economics Became a Mathematical Science. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 